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Ab stract
In this in tro duc tory ar ti cle to the vol ume of the South Af ri can Jour nal of Phi -
loso phy in trib ute of  Hans- Georg Gada mer, the author, first, makes a few re -
marks about the na ture of her me neu tics and Gadamer's views on the uni ver sal ity 
of the her me neu ti cal ex pe ri ence. This uni ver sal ity is, in par ticu lar, ex plained
from the per spec tive of the “lin guis tic turn” in Gadamer's thought. Sec ondly,
there is a brief dis cus sion of cer tain par ticu lar as pects of Gadamer's con tri bu -
tion. As pects of that con tri bu tion that are em pha sized are: Gadamer's re-
 evaluation of preju dice, author ity and tra di tion, his idea of “Wirkungs -
geschichte”, his idea of mean ing as a pro cess rather than a given en tity, his  ana -
logy be tween game- playing and the in ter pre ta tion of art, and his dia logi cal con -
cep tion of in ter pre ta tion. The author con cludes by de vel op ing his own es ti mate
of the main thrust of Gadamer's con tri bu tion. This con tri bu tion con sists of the
way in which Gadamer's thought, on the one hand, rep re sents a dem on stra tion
and em bodi ment of the kind of his tori cal con scious ness so typi cal of our times,
but, on the other hand, also ac com plishes this ex em pli fi ca tion of his tori cal con -
scious ness while imagi na tively avoid ing the kind of rela tiv is tic his tori cism so
typi cal of many other mani fes ta tions of the same trend.
In this in tro duc tory ar ti cle to the vol ume of the South Af ri can Jour nal of Phi los o phy in 
trib ute of  Hans-Georg Gadamer, I shall, first, make a few re marks about the na ture of
her me neu tics and Gadamer's views on the uni ver sal ity of the hermeneutical ex pe ri -
ence. Sec ond, I shall briefly dis cuss cer tain par tic u lar as pects of Gadamer's con tri bu -
tion. And I shall con clude by de vel op ing my own es ti mate of the main thrust of his
con tri bu tion.
1. The universality of the hermeneutical experience
Gadamer worked in the field of her me neu tics, the sim plest def i ni tion of which is “the
the ory of in ter pre ta tion”. The cen tral ques tion that un der lies Gadamer's mag num opus, 
is, in turn, the hermeneutical ques tion: “what does it mean to un der stand, and un der
what con di tions can/do we un der stand?” Draw ing on Heidegger's iden ti fi ca tion of the
on to log i cal ques tion (“what is the be ing of be ings?”) with the hermeneutical ques tion,
Gadamer ex plores the ques tion about the na ture of and con di tions for un der stand ing in 
con texts that sig nif i cantly tran scend the in ter pre ta tion of texts or the meth od ol ogy of
the hu man sci ences. Schleiermacher was the first thinker to iden tify the hermeneutical
prob lem as a philo soph i cal prob lem – the prob lem about the con di tions un der which
suc cess ful com mu ni ca tion oc curs. Since Schleiermacher, as Ricoeur has shown, re -
flec tion on the hermeneutical prob lem un der went a “deregionalization” and  “ radica -
lization”: al though couched within the per sis tent par a digm of the text-reader sit u a tion,
it was in creas ingly di vorced from be ing only con cerned with the in ter pre ta tion of texts 
(i.e. “deregionalized”) and rad i cal ized in terms of philo soph i cal scope.1 Thus, whereas 
the hermeneutical prob lem for Schleiermacher was the prob lem of the con di tions un -
der which we can un der stand one an other at all in com mu ni ca tion sit u a tions, it be -
comes, for Wil helm Dilthey, an epistemological prob lem: the prob lem of the way in
which and the con di tions un der which knowl edge of his tory (and thus of the hu man
sci ences gen er ally) be come pos si ble. What, in turn, for Dilthey was an epistemological
prob lem, be comes, for Heidegger, an on to log i cal prob lem: the prob lem of the be ing of 
be ings. Heidegger el e vates (deep ens?) the hermeneutical prob lem to the most fun da -
men tal of all philo soph i cal prob lems: the prob lem of the way of be ing of that be ing for 
whom its be ing is to un der stand be ing.2 Thus the on to log i cal ques tion – for Heidegger
the most fun da men tal of all philo soph i cal ques tions – is trans lat able into the
hermeneutical ques tion, since the key to the un der stand ing of be ing is to be found in
the way of be ing of that be ing – the hu man Dasein – whose be ing con sists, es sen tially, 
of the ef fort to un der stand.
Gada mer fol lows Hei deg ger in his iden ti fi ca tion of the her me neu ti cal ques tion as
the most fun da men tal philo sophi cal ques tion. “Her me neu tics is ...a uni ver sal as pect of
phi loso phy, and not just the meth odo logi cal ba sis of the so- called hu man sci ences”
(Gadamer, 1975: 433). Gada mer ex plains his con cern in Truth and Method in the
Fore word to the sec ond edi tion:
It [i.e. his ques tion, put in Kantian terms] asks: How is un der stand ing pos si ble? 
This is a ques tion which pre cedes any ac tion of un der stand ing on the part of
sub jec tiv ity, in clud ing the me thod i cal ac tiv ity of the 'un der stand ing sci ences'
[verstehende Geisteswissenschaften] and their norms and rules. Heidegger's
tem po ral ana lyt ics of hu man ex is tence (Dasein) has, I think, shown  convin -
cingly that un der stand ing is not just one of the var i ous pos si ble be hav iours of
the sub ject, but the mode of be ing of There-be ing [Dasein] it self. This is the
sense in which the term 'her me neu tics' has been used here. It de notes the ba sic
be ing-in-mo tion of There-be ing which con sti tutes its fi nite ness and his to ric ity,
and hence in cludes the whole of its ex pe ri ence of the world. Not ca price, or
even an elab o ra tion of a sin gle as pect, but the na ture of the thing it self makes
the move ment of un der stand ing com pre hen sive and uni ver sal (Gadamer,
1975:xviii).
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1 This point is per sua sively ar gued by Rossouw 1980.
2 Some how this point is better/clearer made in Af ri kaans: Die hermeneutiese probleem word die mees
fundamentele probleem van die filosofie deurdat dit die probleem word van die synde wie se synswyse
ten diepste synsinterpretasie is, d.i. die poging om (sigself) te probeer verstaan. Verstaan is m.a.w. die
synswyse van die synde vir wie dit in sy syn, gáán om eie syn.
That hermeneutical ex pe ri ence is uni ver sal and un der lies all as pects of our ex pe ri ence
of the world (Welterfahrung) is a cen tral claim of Gadamer. The rea son for this is sug -
gested in the pre vi ous quoted pas sage. Un der stand ing, for Gadamer as for Heidegger,
is some thing sig nif i cantly more than suc cess ful com mu ni ca tion or the unique mode of
knowl edge of the hu man sci ences. Un der stand ing is the pri mor dial or orig i nal way in
which we as hu man be ings are what we are. That the hermeneutical ex pe ri ence is uni -
ver sal, means, for Gadamer, dif fer ent things. First, it means that un der stand ing is not
sim ply one hu man ac tiv ity, to be dis tin guished from a range of other hu man ac tiv i ties.
Rather, it is that which un der lies and is pre sup posed by all other hu man ac tiv i ties. This 
con cern with un der stand ing as our “orig i nal” or “pri mor dial” fa mil iar ity with the
world is in dic a tive of the in flu ence of Husserl's phe nom en ol ogy on Gadamer. In phe -
nom en ol ogy, the con cern is not so much with sci ence as a mode of knowl edge, to be
dis tin guished from other modes, but rather with sci ence as a sec ond ary, in ferred mode
of knowl edge that pre sup poses a more orig i nal ac cess that we have to re al ity.
Gadamer's con tri bu tion in this re spect is to in di cate the cen tral ity of “un der stand ing”
for the ef fort to iden tify this pri mor dial ac cess to re al ity. Also the nat u ral sci ences pre -
sup pose pro cesses of un der stand ing in their search for truth. All sci en tific ac tiv i ties
are, ac cord ing to Gadamer, di rected by a pre-knowl edge that is em bed ded in lan guage. 
This “pre-knowl edge” takes the form of an ho ri zon of fun da men tal mean ings of re al ity 
in its unity and to tal ity – a frame work to which lan guage pri mar ily pro vides ac cess, as
will soon be shown. The pro cess of un der stand ing (verstehen ) – that which is be ing
in ves ti gated in her me neu tics – is the sys tem atic elu ci da tion of this pre-knowl edge. It
be comes ap par ent, not only in the for mu la tion of the goals of sci ence (that re quires
nor ma tive dis cus sions) but also in the com mu ni ca tion be tween sci en tists as re gards
their cri te ria for test ing a suc cess ful hy poth e sis, and in par tic u lar, in the ap pli ca tion of
sci en tific re sults to ev ery day life. In all of this the uni ver sal ity of the her me neu tic ex -
pe ri ence and con scious ness is dem on strated.
The uni ver sal ity of the her me neu tic ex pe ri ence can also be ex plained by that which
Rich ard Bern stein calls the “lin guis tic turn” in Gadamer's her me neu tics (Bern stein
1983:34). In this re spect, I ref er to Gadamer's views on the lin guis tic char ac ter of the
in ter preter and the pro cess of un der stand ing it self. For Gada mer, lan guage is the pri -
mary mode of hu man ex is tence: “un der stand ing is lan guage bound” (Gadamer,
1980:139). Lan guage is the me dium through which both man and world be come ap -
par ent as dis tin guish able, mean ing ful en ti ties. There is, for Gada mer, no world “out -
side of lan guage”:
The lin guis tic anal y sis of our ex pe ri ence of the world is prior, as con trasted
with ev ery thing that is rec og nized and ad dressed as be ings. The fun da men tal
re la tion of lan guage and world does not, then, mean that the world be comes the 
ob ject of lan guage. Rather, the ob ject of knowl edge and of state ments is al -
ready en closed within the world ho ri zon of lan guage... The lin guis tic na ture of
the hu man ex pe ri ence of the world does not in clude mak ing the world into an
ob ject. (Gadamer, 1967:426,408)
And else where:
Be ing that can be un der stood is lan guage...That which can be un der stood is
lan guage...The his tor i cal con scious ness, in fact, also in volved me di a tion be -
tween past and pres ent. By see ing that lan guage was the uni ver sal me dium of
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this me di a tion, we were able to ex tend our en quiry...to uni ver sal di men sions.
For man's re la tion to the world is ab so lutely and fun da men tally lin guis tic in na -
ture, and hence in tel li gi ble. Thus her me neu tics is...a uni ver sal as pect of phi los -
o phy, not just the meth od olog i cal ba sis of the hu man sci ences. (Gadamer,
1975:432-433)
There is no point out side of the lin guis ti cally me di ated ex pe ri ence of the world from
which the world it self can be come an ob ject of in quiry (Gadamer, 1967:429). What
Gada mer ve he mently op poses, is an in stru men tal con cep tion of lan guage, i.e. a view
that re gards lan guage as no more than a mecha nism by means of which we, for purely
prag matic pur poses, af ter wards (i.e. hav ing ex pe ri enced it in its al leged mean ing ful -
ness) de scribe a world that is al ready mean ing ful “in it self”. He shows the im pli ca tions 
of Heidegger's claim that lan guage is the “house of be ing”. Be ing comes to light via
lan guage: “Be ing comes to lan guage by open ing it self up” (Gadamer, 1967:192). Lan -
guage does not pro duce a for mu la tion of some thing that we might have been able to
un der stand on a pre- linguistic level; lan guage, as the mode of be ing, is it self the pro -
cess of un der stand ing. “It is not the re flec tion of some thing given, but the com ing into
lan guage of a to tal ity of mean ing...Be ing that can be un der stood is lan guage”
(Gadamer, 1967:450, 431- 432).
Fur ther more: we do not pos sess or con trol lan guage. We learn lan guage and con -
form to the ways in which lan guage, through liv ing con ver sa tion, takes hold of us.
Lan guage does not be long to us; we be long to it. We par tici pate in the in ner dy nam ics
with which lan guage reg is ters the his tori cal (geschicht li che) ar ri val of be ing con ver sa -
tion ally. Hu man ex pe ri ence is not a non- linguistic or pre- linguistic given that we, as
autono mous sub jects, ar ticu late by “find ing or cre at ing the right words” for it. All ex -
pe ri ence (Gada mer, in this re spect, in cludes the ex pe ri ence of the natu ral sci ences) is
by and large lin guis tic, language- bound or con di tioned by lan guage. When we ar ticu -
late and ex pe ri ence, we re spond to the claims of that which is be ing ex pe ri enced. We
cor re spond with or re ply to the words that be long to the is sue or mat ter (Sa che) of that 
which is be ing ex pe ri enced.
The claim to the uni ver sal ity of the her me neu tic ex pe ri ence and con scious ness not
only rep re sents one of Gadamer's most im por tant con tri bu tions in de vel op ing “her me -
neu tic phi los o phy” in the course of the 20th cen tury and in break ing sig nif i cant new
ground, but also proved to be of cen tral im por tance in his de bate with Jürgen
Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel in the six ties and sev en ties – a de bate that must count as 
one of the most clas si cal ex am ples of con struc tive philo soph i cal di a logues of all times. 
We shall not ex plore that is sue here.3
2. Particular contributions by Gadamer
Bef ore dwell ing on what, to my mind, was Gadamer's most im por tant con tri bu tion, let
me, very briefly ref er to as pects of his work that com manded great in ter est in the
philo sophi cal com mu nity. For rea sons of space, no more then, at most, ru di men tary re -
marks can be made about each:
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3 For an in sight ful ex po si tion of this de bate, cf. Warnke 1987:107-138. The de bate was ini tially prompted 
by a re view that Habermas wrote of Wahrheit und Methode, later pub lished in his Zur Logik der
Sozialwissenschaften. For the Eng lish ver sion, cf. Habermas 1988:143-170. See also Habermas 1980.
The main con tri bu tions to the de bate, in clud ing Gadamer's re sponses, were pub lished in Apel et al.
1977.
° Gadamer was quite orig i nal in his crit i cisms of the En light en ment, and thus be -
came – prob a bly con trary to his in ten tion – the pre cur sor of a host of 20th cen tury
think ers who em pha sized the de rail ment that the En light en ment brought about
rather than the eman ci pa tion tra di tion ally as so ci ated with it (e.g. by Kant – cf. his
fa mous es say “An an swer to the ques tion: what is En light en ment?”).4 As is well
known, mod ern think ers such as Des cartes, Fran cis  Ba con and Kant strin gently
crit i cized the hold that prej u dice, au thor ity and tra di tion ex erted on think ing in the 
pre-modern world. Gadamer, in turn, re acts equally strin gently to the En light en -
ment's “prej u dice against prej u dice”. His point is that all un der stand ing only re ally 
be comes pos si ble on the ba sis of our crit i cal re-assessment of the ho ri zon of fun -
da men tal mean ings re ferred to ear lier. These mean ings al ready and in ev i ta bly
char ac ter ize and con di tion our hu man ex is tence, and con sti tute the nec es sary con -
di tion for all con tin ued pro cesses of in ter pre ta tion. Be fore any in ter pre ta tion can
oc cur (let's take text in ter pre ta tion as an ex am ple) the text must be con ceived of
“as some thing”. But that “some thing” is nec es sar ily a func tion of our pre con -
ceived idea about the text, as well as of the au thor ity of the tra di tion on which we
in ev i ta bly rely when try ing, at first, to un der stand the text.
° The in ter pre ta tion of texts (the term “texts” is here used as model for all en ti ties
that con tain mean ing and thus are po ten tial ob jects of in ter pre ta tion), in ad di tion,
nec es sar ily and in ev i ta bly form part of a tra di tion pro cess from which we, in ter -
pret ers, can not di vorce our selves and that has to be taken into ac count when we
try to un der stand a text. This tra di tion pro cess rep re sents what Gadamer calls the
Wirkungsgeschichte, of the text, and the con scious ness of which he calls the
wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewusstsein (the con scious ness that is ef fected by his -
tory).5 These con cepts try to con vey his idea that when we in ter pret a text (e.g. the 
Bi ble), our in ter pre ta tion will nec es sar ily be rad i cally in flu enced by the other
read ings of that text that pre cede our own and that at tained a cer tain cred i bil ity
and au thor ity in his tory.
° The mean ing that is the out come of any pro cess of in ter pre ta tion is, ac cord ing to
Gadamer, not ever a com pleted mat ter of fact that, once it has been ac com plished,
is thus over and done with. This mean ing is much rather a course of events or,
better, a pro cess that can, as far as con tents is con cerned, change to the ex tent that
the his tor i cal sit u a tion or frame work from which we ques tion the text, changes or
shifts. A text there fore does not have one, com pleted or fix ated mean ing, and,
most em phat i cally, the mean ing of a text does not nec es sar ily co-incide with the
in ten tion of its au thor(s).6 The mean ing of a text is the re sult or out come of the
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4 Cf. Kant 1970. The open ing para graph of this fa mous es say states: “En light en ment is man's emer gence
from his self-incurred im ma tu rity. Im ma tu rity is the in abil ity to use one's own un der stand ing with out the 
guid ance of an other. This im ma tu rity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of un der stand ing, but lack of 
res o lu tion and cour age to use it with out the guid ance of an other. The motto of en light en ment is there -
fore: Sapere aude [lit er ally: “dare to be wise”]! Have cour age to use your own un der stand ing!” (Kant
1970:54, his ital ics)
5 Some Gadamer-interpreters re gard Gadamer's ex po si tion of this idea as his main con tri bu tion. Cf. the ar -
ti cle by Fouché in this vol ume (Fouché 2002), as well as the doc toral dis ser ta tion on which it is based
(Fouché 2001), in which it is ar gued that the whole of Gadamer's oeuvre ought to be un der stood in view
of his idea of the Wirkungsgeschichte.
6 For a dis cus sion of a con structed de bate on this is sue be tween Gadamer and E.D. Hirsch, cf. Warnke
1987:42-72.
“fu sion of ho ri zons”, the one ho ri zon be ing the con text within which the text  ori -
ginated, and the other the con text con sti tut ing the in ter pre tive pos si bil i ties, con -
cerns and ques tions of the in ter preter.7 The im pli ca tion of this in sight, as he also
for mu lates it at the end of the pas sage quoted in foot note 7, is that ap pli ca tion is
an es sen tial part of in ter pre ta tion. It is a fal lacy to work with the con struc tion that
the text has some mean ing of its own, and that the act of in ter pre ta tion can, at best, 
seek out that (orig i nal) mean ing and af ter wards ap ply it to the sit u a tion, needs or
ques tions of the in ter preter. Rather, ac cord ing to Gadamer, there is no in ter pre ta -
tion that is not, from the out set, also an ap pli ca tion to the con cerns con tained in
the ho ri zon of the in ter preter. To re it er ate: the text has no “fixed mean ing” – also
not in its con text of orig i na tion. The mean ing of the text is es tab lished through the 
fu sion of ho ri zons, and that im plies that its mean ing is con stantly shift ing, since
the out come of the fu sion is, ev ery time, a blend ing of two or more dif fer ent con -
cerns in di verse, dis tin guish able, his tor i cal sit u a tions.
° Two last as pects of Gadamer's con tri bu tion de serve men tion bef ore I pro ceed to
the fi nal evalua tion of his work. The first is his bril liant analy sis of the con cept of
play as key to the un der stand ing of a work of art, or, as Gada mer him self for mu -
lates it, “play as the clue to on to logi cal ex pla na tion” (1975:91- 99). At ten tion to
this analy sis is also paid by some of the ar ti cles in this vol ume, and I shall be very
brief about it. The main point that Gada mer makes about play, is that, in an swer to 
the ques tion “who plays the game?”, there is both an “ob jec tive” and a “sub jec -
tive” an swer. On the one hand, the game is its own sub ject; when the player em -
barks on a game, s/he (some times lit er ally) en ters a set space and be comes in -
volved in ac tivi ties gov erned by rules that de ter mine the scope of pos si ble moves
and ac tivi ties. Play is a strange dia lec tic of light ness and se ri ous ness; we play for
the sake of re laxa tion and es cape, yet, when play ing, we are quite se ri ous about
what we are do ing. What we can do, is lim ited, ac cord ing to the rules of the game. 
In this sense, the game tends to “play it self”; it is its own sub ject. As Gada mer for -
mu lates it:
The ap peal of the game, the fas ci na tion it ex erts, con sists in the fact that it be -
comes mas ter of the player. Even when games are con cerned in which one tries 
to ful fil tasks one has set one self, it is the risk, the ques tion of whether it
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7 Cf. Gadamer's own ex po si tion of this idea: “In fact the ho ri zon of the pres ent is be ing con tin u ally
formed, in that we have con tin u ally to test all our prej u dices. An im por tant part of this test ing is the en -
coun ter with the past and the un der stand ing of the tra di tion from which we come. Hence the ho ri zon of
the pres ent can not be formed with out the past. There is no more an iso lated ho ri zon of the pres ent than
there are his tor i cal ho ri zons. Un der stand ing, rather, is al ways the fu sion of these ho ri zons which we
imag ine to ex ist by them selves.... Ev ery en coun ter with tra di tion that takes place within his tor i cal con -
scious ness in volves the ex pe ri ence of the ten sion be tween the text and the pres ent. The her me neu tic task 
con sists in not cov er ing up this ten sion by at tempt ing a naïve as sim i la tion but con sciously bring ing it
out. This why it is part of the her me neu tic ap proach to pro ject a his tor i cal ho ri zon that is dif fer ent from
the ho ri zon of the pres ent.... The pro ject ing of the his tor i cal ho ri zon then, is only a phase in the pro cess
of un der stand ing, and does not be come so lid i fied into the self-alienation of a past con scious ness, but is
over taken by our own pres ent ho ri zon of un der stand ing. In the pro cess of un der stand ing there takes
place a real fus ing of ho ri zons, which means that as the his tor i cal ho ri zon is pro jected, it is si mul ta -
neously re moved. We de scribed the con scious act of this fu sion as the task of ef fec tive-historical con -
scious ness [wirkungsgeschichtlichen Bewusstsein]. Al though this task had been ob scured by aes thetic
his tor i cal pos i tiv ism in the train of ro man tic her me neu tics, it is, in fact, the cen tral prob lem of her me -
neu tics. It is the prob lem of ap pli ca tion that ex ists in all un der stand ing” (Gadamer, 1975:273-274).
'works', 'suc ceeds', or 'suc ceeds again' that ex er cises the game's at trac tion. The
ac tual sub ject of the game (pre cisely those ex pe ri ences make this clear in which 
there is only a sin gle player) is not the player but the game it self. The game is
what holds the player in its spell, draws him into play, and keeps him there
(Gadamer, 1975:95-96).
At the same time, a game is only a game in as much as it is played by play ers. Ev ery
play ing of the game rep re sents a new di men sion, a new in stance of the game, and can -
not be pre dicted. Within the con fines of the set rules, a bril liant player can ex plore, de -
velop, ex ploit, and even “dis cover” pos si bil i ties in ac ces si ble to play ers less skilled.  In 
this way, Pele can trans form the pos si bil i ties of “drib bling be fore you shoot”, Naas
Botha could trans form the pat tern of rugby by his skill at drop goals, and Björn Borg
could ex ploit di men sions of base line play in ten nis that was not seen be fore his as cen -
dancy to the game. These play ers “play the game”, yet, in their play ing re veal di men -
sions of the game not known prior to their ac tual play. In this sense, play ing is not
“ob jec tive” but “sub jec tive”. Thus, while at the same ar gu ing that “the game is its own 
sub ject”, Gadamer also ar gues that the play ers of a game are its cre ators.
What Gada mer does, is to ex plore the anal ogy be tween this analy sis of game play -
ing, and the in ter pre ta tion of works of art. Geor gia Warnke, in her lu cid dis cus sion of
Gadamer's analy sis (cf. Warnke 1987:48- 56), for mu lates the anal ogy as fol lows:
If works of art and games are sim i lar in re gard to their char ac ter as self-rep re -
sen ta tions, this sim i lar ity sug gests that works of art will take on a con crete ex is -
tence only in be ing viewed or read. Thus, al though works of art will have the
same nor ma tive pri or ity over view ers and read ers that games have over play ers, 
view ers and read ers will also be as es sen tial to works of art as play ers are to
games (Warnke 1987:51).
As Warnke also shows, a sec ond con se quence can be drawn form Gadamer's analy sis.
That is that works of art do not have a fixed mean ing that can not ever change. Games
only have con crete ex is tence in be ing played. Simi larly, works of art only have con -
crete ex is tence in be ing read or viewed. If their con crete ex is tence is de pend ent on
their be ing read or viewed, then every read ing or view ing opens up the pos si bil ity of a
changed in ter pre ta tion. “Thus, al though a game re mains the same game in some sense
it can also be en tirely dif fer ent each time it is played. If the same holds true of a work
of art it will also re main self- identical while con stantly chang ing. In deed, at is sue, ac -
cord ing to Gada mer, are en ti ties that are 'only in be ing dif fer ent' ” (Warnke 1987:51).
Al though so much more of Gadamer's con tri bu tion may be high lighted, the last that
I want to re fer to in pass ing, is his orig i nal ex pli ca tion of the dialogical struc ture of in -
ter pre ta tion (cf. Gadamer 1975:330-351). The sig nif i cance of this anal y sis is the way
in which it at tempts to res cue Gadamer's views from the re proach that he han dles a
con cept of in ter pre ta tion that is given to sub jec tiv ism and rel a tiv ism, ren der ing the in -
ter pret ing sub ject the norm and fi nal ar bi ter in in ter pre ta tion pro cesses. This, ac cord -
ing to Gadamer, is not a valid re proach if we con sider and un der stand the fact that sin -
cere in ter pre ta tion is the out come of a di a logue be tween text and in ter preter. For his
anal y sis, Gadamer draws on the orig i nal ten ets of So cratic di a logue, where the point of 
de par ture is the docta ignorantia, the ac knowl edge ment that the par tic i pants in a di a -
logue, other than in the case of a de bate, both know noth ing at the out set; they re al ize
and ad mit their own fal li bil ity. The di a logue is also in this as pect dif fer ent from a de -
bate in that the par tic i pants in di a logue de lib er ately seek the strong, rather than the
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weak points in the ar gu ments of their dis cus sion part ners. They en ter into a con ver sa -
tion about some thing; the di a logue has some “Sache”, some sub ject of dis cus sion.
What is sought, is the truth about this “Sache”, rather than a con cern about what
makes the other per son claim what he or she claims/ar gue, what is “be hind their
claims”.  They are com mit ted to fol low the con ver sa tion wher ever logic and rea son
may lead. They ac cept that the out come of the pro cess may be a po si tion that rad i cally
dif fers from the one they held at the out set. As Gadamer him self for mu lates it:
Com ing to an un der stand ing in con ver sa tion [i.e. di a logue] pre sup poses that the 
part ners are ready for it and that they try to al low for the va lid ity of what is
alien and con trary to them selves. If this hap pens on a re cip ro cal ba sis and each
of the part ners, while hold ing to his own ground si mul ta neously weighs the
coun ter ar gu ments, they can ul ti mately achieve a com mon lan guage and a com -
mon judge ment in an im per cep ti ble and non-ar bi trary trans fer of view -
points...What steps out in its truth is the Lo gos, which is nei ther mine nor yours 
and which there fore so far su per sedes the sub jec tive opin ions of the dis cus sion
part ners that even the leader of the dis cus sion al ways re mains the ig no rant one
(Gadamer, 1975:348, 331).
Once the in ter pre ta tion pro cess is un der stood in this light, it be comes im pos si ble to
ren der the reader of a text sov er eign as far as the out come is con cerned. The text is
some thing from which I, as the reader, must be will ing to learn; it has some thing to
say; its mean ing, as that of a part ner in dia logue, is not re spected if it is bru tally sub -
jected to what ever whims and wishes I, as reader, proj ect onto it. The dia logi cal con -
cep tion of in ter pre ta tion is a pow er ful ar gu ment against the kind of sub jec tiv ism that
Gada mer has of ten been ac cused of in the re cep tion of his work.
3. Gadamer's main contribution: historical consciousness without relativism
This brings us, then, to what I re gard as Gadamer's most im por tant con tri bu tion to phi -
los o phy in the course of the 20th cen tury.8 To my mind, this con tri bu tion con sists of
the way in which Gadamer's thought, on the one hand, rep re sents a dem on stra tion and
em bodi ment of the kind of his tor i cal con scious ness so typ i cal of our times, but, on the 
other hand, also ac com plishes this ex em pli fi ca tion of his tor i cal con scious ness while,
at the same time, imag i na tively avoid ing the kind of rel a tiv is tic historicism so typ i cal
of many other man i fes ta tions of the same trend. In the pro cess, it fa cil i tates a
postmetaphysical think ing9 – which, to my mind, is a de sid er a tum – with out suc cumb -
ing to the kind of cul tural rel a tiv ism which now a days, in the name of “postmodern
think ing”, is so of ten prop a gated.
By the term “his tor i cal con scious ness” I mean that which came to pass in the af ter -
math of Hegel's con tri bu tion to West ern phi los o phy: a rev o lu tion ary un der stand ing of
the in flu ence of time and his tory on our self-understanding and our un der stand ing of
the world, the re al iza tion that all knowl edge is in com plete be cause it is sit u ated in, is a 
func tion of, and is there fore made pos si ble by a ho ri zon of his tor i cally me di ated mean -
ings which con sti tutes the un avoid able plat form from which we, via our in ter pre ta tive
ex is tence, make our way through the world and his tory. Gadamer's thought is a con sis -
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8 In ar gu ing this point, I draw on in sights de vel oped in some of my ear lier ar ti cles, par tic u larly Van
Niekerk 1994 and 1997.
9 This term was coined by Habermas; cf. his book which has this ti tle (Habermas 1992).
tent re ac tion to the idea of an unsituated rea son, as well as against tran scen den tal ism:
the idea that rea son re mains of ne ces sity what it is, ir re spec tive of his tor i cal in flu ences 
and de vel op ments. Be cause of Gadamer's con tri bu tion, we more than ever re al ize that
rea son is a prod uct of his tory (gen er ated dur ing the Greek En light en ment), that it reg u -
larly be comes threat ened by ir ra tio nal rup tures in the tra di tion10, and that that which is
worth while in the tra di tion of West ern ra tio nal ity ought there fore to be cher ished and
pro tected, rather than rid i culed and aban doned.
Gadamer's em pha sis on the linguisticality and his to ric ity of the pro cess of un der -
stand ing is of ten in ter preted as a co vert apol ogy for rel a tiv ism and historicism.11
Gadamer him self strongly de nies the le git i macy of such a re proach:
[T]his as ser tion [viz. that un der stand ing is lan guage bound] does not lead us
into any kind of lin guis tic rel a tiv ism...While we live wholly within a lan guage,
the fact that we do so does not con sti tute lin guis tic rel a tiv ism be cause there is
ab so lutely no cap tiv ity within a lan guage – not even within our na tive lan -
guage...Any lan guage in which we live is in fi nite in this sense, and it is com -
pletely mis taken to in fer that rea son is frag mented be cause there are var i ous
lan guages. Just the op po site is the case. Pre cisely through our fini tude, the par -
tic u lar ity of our be ing, which is ev i dent even in the va ri ety of lan guages, the in -
fi nite di a logue is opened in the di rec tion of the truth that we are (Gadamer,
1980:139).
This state ment, of course, pre sup poses that hu man lin guis ti cal ity – the con sti tu tive as -
pect of both the in quirer and the ob ject of in quiry in the hu man sci ences – is struc tured 
in a uni ver sally cor re spond ing way, resp. that the uni ver sal struc ture of the “lan guage
that we are” guar an tees the pos si bil ity of mu tual un der stand ing and con sen sus, via the
dia logue with the tra di tion. He in sists through out that, be cause of the radi cal lin guis ti -
cal ity of man and world, trans la tion be tween lan guages is and re mains a real pos si bil -
ity:
The his tor i cal 'worlds' that suc ceed one an other in the course of his tory are dif -
fer ent from one an other and from the world of to day; but it is al ways, in what -
ever tra di tion we con sider it, a hu man, i.e. lin guis ti cally con sti tuted world that
pres ents it self to us (Gadamer, 1975:405).
Gadamer's ar tic u la tion of his tor i cal con scious ness, cou pled with his avoid ance of rel a -
tiv ism, is best il lus trated by his in sis tence, con trary to many of those who wish to ap -
pro pri ate his con tri bu tion in the name of postmodernism12, on the fact that real un der -
stand ing is an un der stand ing of truth, resp. by his claim that in ter pre ta tion is al ways
in spired by the no tion of truth as reg u la tive idea. This im plies fur ther more that
Gadamer, other than some of his postmodern usurp ers, does not have any prob lem
with the claim that the out come of un der stand ing is a type of knowl edge. What he does 
re ject, is the le git i macy of sub mit ting this knowl edge to cri te ria that are obliv i ous to its 
unique na ture and char ac ter is tics.
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10 The Ho lo caust and Apart heid are two in dis put able ex am ples.
11 Cf. Trigg 1985:197 ff. I draw on some in sights of Trigg for this point.
12 Su san Hekman is a case in point. Cf. her 1990:13-70. Rich ard Rorty, with whom I shall deal shortly, is
an other ex am ple of this type of mis guided in ter pre ta tion of Gadamer.
Gadamer's con tri bu tion in this re gard can best be ap pre ci ated if we com pare it to
that of Rich ard Rorty, a thinker who not only pro poses that “her me neu tics” re place
“phi loso phy” in the post- philosophical era that he dra mati cally an nounces, an tici pates
and en vi sions in the last part of his Phi loso phy and the mir ror of na ture (Rorty
1980:313- 356), but who spe cifi cally claims that he draws, for this idea, on the ideas of 
Gada mer (Rorty 1980:357- 364). I would like to ar gue that Rorty's in ter pre ta tion of the 
im pli ca tions of Gadamer's con tri bu tion is con sid era bly flawed. The most im por tant
dif fer ence be tween these two think ers, as sug gested in the pre vious para graph, is that
whereas Rorty wishes to re lin quish the En light en ment striv ing for knowl edge, truth
and ra tion al ity, Gada mer, in spite of his criti cisms of as pects of the En light en ment (as
has been shown), never goes that far, but rather wishes to broaden the mean ing of
these con cepts.
For ex am ple, Rorty in ter prets Gadamer's cri tique of the En light en ment's “prej u dice
against prej u dice”, in con junc tion with his take on the in sights of post-empiricist phi -
los o phy of sci ence (about which Gadamer does not ex press him self) as a suf fi cient ex -
cuse to aban don the tra di tional dis tinc tion be tween the nat u ral and the hu man sci -
ences.13 Ac cord ing to Rorty, there are no es sen tial dif fer ences be tween these two en -
ter prises (Rorty 1980:362 ff.); they are merely dif fer ent “cop ing mech a nisms” by
means of which we find our way through life. The nat u ral sci ences owe their stat ure
and sta tus in our cul ture en tirely to the prag matic use to which they can be put within
the need struc ture of a par tic u lar kind of so ci ety, viz. West ern lib eral de moc ra cies.
There is no non-circular way to dem on strate ei ther the “truth” of the knowl edge that
these sci ences yield or the “uni ver sal va lid ity” of the cri te ria used to le git i mate their
claims (Rorty 1985:12 ff.). Other “cop ing mech a nisms” are valid in other cul tures with 
other needs (e.g. magic for the Zande), and, claims Rorty, there is no way in which we 
are able to prove the su pe ri or ity of our ways of knowl edge; in fact, the search for the
ground ing of knowl edge types is it self a prod uct of our cul ture, and not some thing
that, as such, is even sought or con sid ered im por tant in other cul tures.
Rorty is jus ti fied in draw ing on Gadamer in sup port of his claim that the  natural
 sciences are not, in any ahistorical sense, valid.14 But he is not jus ti fied in in vok ing
Gadamer's au thor ity for the claim that knowl edge and truth, as aims/ends of in tel lec -
tual in quiry, must sim ply be aban doned be cause of the fact that both the nat u ral and
the hu mans sci ences are both his tor i cally lo cal ized. As Warnke per sua sively shows
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13 I draw, for some of the in sights that fol low, on the dis cus sion of these mat ters by Warnke 1987:139-166.
14 Gadamer il lus trates this amongst oth ers by re fer ring to tact, taste and judge ment, i.e. forms of (prac ti cal) 
knowl edge that can not me me thod i cally grounded, and that con se quently not be long to the sphere of
mod ern sci ence prac tice, but that nev er the less re main forms of knowl edge on the ba sis of which it is
pos si ble to dem on strate our ca pac ity to rec og nize truth. Dif fer ently put: they rep re sent “cop ing mech a -
nisms” (Rorty's term) that can not be “epistemologically grounded” and that thus re main part of the plu -
ral ity of al ter na tive “cop ing mech a nisms” of which Bildung as “ed i fi ca tion” (also Rorty's term; cf. his
1980:357-389) makes us con scious. But it is ex actly as al ter na tive “cop ing mech a nisms” that they, nev -
er the less, re main forms of knowl edge, in the sense that they con tinue to pre sup pose our ca pac ity to dis -
tin guish truth from fal sity. For Gadamer, two as pects of tact, taste and judge ment are im por tant: 1. All
three pre sup pose our abil ity to dis crim i nate, i.e. to place value,, im por tance or rel e vance in some or der
of pri or ity, and 2. all three are not purely in di vid ual ca pac i ties, but must be ac count able or jus ti fi able, or 
must be able to at tain le git i macy, within a com mu nity. Some body has tact, taste or judge ment, not be -
cause he or she thinks they have, but be cause other peo ple think so! (Cf. Gadamer 1975:10-39, and
Warnke 1987:159-160).
(1987:159-163), the dis tinc tion be tween the nat u ral and hu man sci ences re mains valid
and im por tant for Gadamer ex actly be cause he wishes to show that there are other
forms of knowl edge (and thus truth), and that it is not le git i mate to force the kind of re -
quire ments ap pro pri ate for the nat u ral sci ences onto these other knowl edge forms.
It is in deed the case that Gadamer, sim i larly to Rorty, re jects the idea that phi los o -
phy is to be iden ti fied with epis te mol ogy; Gadamer also en vi sions a dif fer ent role for
phi los o phy. For Rorty, this dif fer ent role is “ed i fi ca tion” and “con ver sa tion”: no lon -
ger the search for foun da tions, but at most an ex pli ca tion of “how things hang to -
gether” (Rorty 1982:xl). Some times, as shown by Warnke (1987:162 ff.), Gadamer
seems to be mak ing the same point. How ever, his prob lem with mod ern phi los o phy's
epistemological ori en ta tion is not the fact that phi los o phy at tempts a jus ti fi ca tion of
knowl edge. The prob lem much rather is the fact that, in mod ern phi los o phy, there is
an un jus ti fied ten dency to el e vate the sci en tific jus ti fi ca tion of knowl edge to the model 
or par a digm of all pro cesses of jus ti fi ca tion and for all kinds of knowl edge.
Gada mer con trasts this ten dency in mod ern phi loso phy with the much older philo -
sophi cal tra di tion of prac ti cal phi loso phy. In this tra di tion, the is sue was not pri mar ily
the iden ti fi ca tion and le giti ma tion of the con di tions of knowl edge, but an ac count of
the way in which dif fer ent forms of knowl edge ad dress dif fer ent needs of peo ple (cf.
Gadamer's ex pli ca tion of techne and phrone sis, Gada mer 1975:278 ff.). In the lat ter,
the is sue is not the ob jec tiv ity of facts, but the fa cili ta tion of so cial aims, i.e. the de sign 
of proj ects by means of which I can suc cess fully ori en tate my self in the world and
thus come to a har mo ni ous un der stand ing and mo dus vivendi with my fel low men and
women (Warnke 1987:162). The prob lem with mod er nity for Gada mer is thus  not
 science as such, but the ab so lu tized faith in the pos si bili ties of sci ence (Ibid. 163).
I said ear lier that Gadamer, like Rorty, does en vi sion a dif fer ent role for phi los o phy
than that which it played in the high noon of the En light en ment era. What is this new
role? The task of phi los o phy, ac cord ing to Gadamer (as in ter preted by Warnke, cf. her 
1987:163 ff.) is nei ther to stick to be ing the the ory of sci ence, nor to be pure “cul tural
dilletantism”, as Rorty prop a gates.15 If phi los o phy has to aban don its epistemological
func tion, it is not be cause that func tion has no sense, but be cause that func tion was too 
nar rowly de fined. The task of phi los o phy is to in te grate our knowl edge within the
frame work of a more com pre hen sive to tal ity, i.e. to con trib ute to the es tab lish ment of
a pub lic con sen sus on com mon goals and to thus as sist to give di rec tion to sci en tific
and tech no log i cal re search.
To this must be added a fur ther task of phi los o phy: to main tain the Ar is to te lian in -
spired striv ing for the good, i.e. to not only ground or jus tify knowl edge claims, but
also to keep ask ing: what kind of life is worth liv ing?, resp. to de sign a life pol icy, de -
rived from a view of life.16 Phi los o phy must as sist in the for ma tion of a new con sen sus 
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15 Ac cord ing to Rorty, then phi los o pher of the fu ture must be an “in formed dil et tante” or a “poly prag ma -
tic, So cratic in ter me di ary be tween dif fer ent dis courses”. “In his sa lon, so to speak, her metic think ers are 
charm ed out of their self-enclosed prac tices... For her me neu tics [which, for Rorty, is the 'suc ces -
sor-discipline' of phi los o phy], to be ra tio nal is to be will ing to re frain from epis te mol ogy – from think -
ing that there is a spe cial set of terms in which all con tri bu tions to the con ver sa tion should be put – and
to be will ing to pick up the jar gon of the in ter loc u tor rather than trans lat ing it into one's own” (Rorty
1980:317-318).
16 These terms can be de fined as fol lows: “For the ex e cu tion of the life task we need a life pol icy, i.e. a
strat egy ac cord ing to which we can or der our lives in the world, and thus make life it self pos si ble. Such
a life pol icy en tails a frame work of nor ma tive prin ci ples that serve as gen eral guide lines for the choices
about ad e quate goals for so cial life, resp. a new rec og ni tion of “sol i dar ity” (Warnke
1987:164). Gadamer writes in this re gard:
Just as we in the over stim u lated pro cess of prog ress of our tech no log i cal civ i li -
za tion are blind to the sta ble, un chang ing el e ments of our so cial life to gether,
so could it be come with the re-awak en ing con scious ness of the sol i dar ity of a
hu man ity that slowly be gins to show it self as hu man ity. This means that it
knows it self to be long to gether, for better or for worse, and that it must solve
the prob lems of its life on this planet. And I there fore be lieve in the re-awak en -
ing of sol i dar i ties that could en ter into a fu ture so ci ety of hu man ity (Gadamer,
as quoted by Warnke 1987:164).
This is a far cry from Rorty's idea of “soli dar ity” which has noth ing to do with the dis -
cov ery of a com mon hu man ity amongst all peo ple, as the quoted pas sage sug gests, but 
ex actly with a de fense of and iden ti fi ca tion with the pa ro chial in ter ests of par ticu lar
groups that might find com mu ni ca tion and con ver sa tion quite dif fi cult. Cf. the fol low -
ing pas sage from one of Rorty's writ ings:
Con sider...the at ti tude of con tem po rary Amer i can lib er als to the un end ing mis -
ery of the lives of the young blacks in Amer i can cit ies. Do we say that these
peo ple must be helped be cause they are our fel low hu man be ings? We may, but 
it is much more per sua sive, mor ally as well as po lit i cally, to de scribe them as
our fel low Amer i cans – to in sist that it is out ra geous that an Amer i can should
live with out hope. The point of these ex am ples is that our sense of sol i dar ity is
stron gest when those with whom sol i dar ity is ex pressed are thought of as “one
of us”, where “us” means some thing smaller and more lo cal than the hu man
race. That is why “be cause she is a hu man be ing” is a weak, un con vinc ing ex -
pla na tion of a gen er ous ac tion (Rorty, 1989:191).
Rorty's “her me neu tics” is thus born from sen ti ments con sid era bly dif fer ent from those
of Gada mer. Rorty not only de nies the de sir abil ity of the main te nance of a ca pac ity for 
mak ing judge ments about truth; he also de nies the pos si bil ity of show ing why the
phrone sis-tr ad ition in moral phi loso phy, which he and Gada mer both ap pre ci ate and
sup port, is bet ter than the avail able al ter na tives.
Over against this, Gada mer propa gates and main tains what Warnke calls a “de ab so -
lu tized”, He ge lian con cep tion of the value and preva lence of ra tion al ity: “rea son de -
vel ops his tori cally through the at tempts of com mu ni ties to form a col lec tive con cep -
tion of 'the good'” (Warnke 1987:165). The in sight that free dom is the high est hu man
value is, for Gada mer, draw ing on He gel, the out come of a his tori cal de vel op ment
pro cess that is ir re versi ble. Dif fer ently from Rorty, he does not re lin quish the idea that
rea son can and does tran scend con ven tional and cul tural bounda ries. He ad mits that all 
cri te ria for ra tion al ity are his tori cally pro duced and that the En light en ment's ahistorical 
con cep tion of rea son is un ten able. That, how ever, does not mean that we are not able
to evalu ate the mer its of the dif fer ent “cop ing mecha nisms”, and that all that we can
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and ac tions of the ev ery day life prac tice. A life pol icy is based upon and le git i mated by a view of life or
a life vi sion. Un der life vi sion we un der stand a whole con glom er ate of in sights about the kind of life that 
is worth liv ing. In sights that have to do with our view of life are life ori en tat ing, di rec tive ideas or be -
liefs. They ex press the val ues that we have to pur sue on the dif fer ent ter rains of life in or der to achieve
ful fill ment and sat is fac tion. In the light of such ideas, we de ter mine which life prac tices and forms are
rel e vant (valu able, im por tant) for a truly hu man ex is tence, and which are not” (Rossouw 1984).
do is to stick to our “eth no cen trism”, as Rorty pro poses. What Gada mer rather claims,
is that we form our selves his tori cally, and that rea son, which strives for free dom,
emerges from a dia logue with oth ers and with the past. In this re spect, and in spite of
their many other dif fer ences, he is more in agree ment with Haber mas than with Rorty:
his tory is the sphere in which rea son emerges and de vel ops, and in which we can and
do make prog ress to wards the at tain ment of free dom. The con scious ness of his tory,
im por tant as it is for Gada mer, is not, for him, as for Rorty, the last word (Warnke
1987:166). Al though we are un de ni able his tori cal be ings, the chal lenge is to also be -
come ra tional ones that at tain the good in a com mu nity that has tran scended the di vi -
sions and al iena tions of our his tori cal situ at ed ness. 
To re it er ate my ear lier claim in con clu sion: Gadamer's main con tri bu tion is to in ter -
pret his tori cal con scious ness in such a way that it does not yield to rela tiv ism and his -
tori cism, and that shows that, on the ba sis of our his tori cal situ at ed ness, we are be ings
that find mean ing in the per pet ual and pro gres sive search for free dom and ra tion al ity.
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